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Forced Population Movements in
the Ottoman Empire and the Early




1 Forced migration is  central  theme of  history.  Temporally,  it  can  be  observed from
ancient  times  to  the  present  era ;  spatially,  it  is  possible  to  view  it  in  several
geographies. No period or geography of human history appears to be immune from this
phenomenon. As many examples demonstrate, the manipulation of the demographic
composition of a territory for the purpose of controlling and dominating its resources
is not restricted to the modern age, when the practice began to take on a different
character due to the political redefinition of the state and its constituents.1 Although
motives of displacement, removal and elimination of a specific population group have
not essentially changed from the pre-modern era, modern implementations deserve
particular conceptualization not only because of the political redefinition of the state
as nation-state and its essential constituent as nation but also for the subtle and diverse
methods employed in manipulating populations and its universalization. In the modern
age, forced population movements were no longer solely the work of ‘great’ states with
the military and political strength to conquer and colonize. They were also used by
‘minor’ states with limited power, as well as by political actors claiming to form the
state. The interaction of economic, political, scientific and intellectual developments in
the 19th century contributed much to the dissemination of practices of manipulating
the population figures and provided the means of doing it in an ‘engineered’ manner.
This paper aims to introduce demographic engineering as an analytical tool and to give
an overview of forced migration in the Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic by
using the vocabulary derived from it. Rather than an exhaustive and in-depth analysis
of the forced population movements, it aims to present a comprehensive conceptual
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framework which may provide broader perspective in approaching forced migration
issues of, particularly, the late Ottoman era and the early Turkish Republic.
 
I. Conceptualizing Forced Migration in the Modern Era:
Demographic Engineering
2 Though demographic engineering, in the wide sense of state intervention in population
figures (in its composition, distribution and increase/decrease) can be used to denote
the manipulation of population composition throughout history, its close association
with  ethnicity,  nationalism,  and  the  nation-state  makes  it  appear  as  an  essentially
modern  phenomenon.  Although  as  Bookman  states  (1997 :  1)  state  intervention  in
population numbers  during the course  of  ‘struggles  for  territory and control  of  its
resources’ has not always been based on ethnicity, demographic engineering is usually
used in the context of inter-ethnic struggles, which may occur in several forms. Thus
the concept  comes also  to  mean ‘demographic  struggle  for  power’  with the aim of
increasing  ‘the  economic  and  political  power  of  an  ethnic  group  relative  to  other
groups.’ This necessarily involves an attempt to increase population numbers of one
group relative to other groups (Bookman, 1997 :  1-2).  McGarry defines demographic
engineering as ‘the state-directed movement of ethnic groups as a technique of conflict
regulation.’ In dealing with diverse ethnic groups, one of the methods that states resort
to is population movement.  States,  he underlines,  impel groups to move ‘through a
variety of incentives or pressures’ or by using force (1998 : 613). The central role of the
sate in moving the population is also emphasized by Weiner and Teitelbaum (2001 : 54)
who consider the concept in relation to states’ search for security and suggest that : 
The implication of the notion of demographic engineering is that the movement of
peoples is not the consequence of social and economic trends – such as differentials
in  wages  or  employment  opportunities  across  regions.  Nor  does  demographic
engineering refer to all actions by the state that result in the large-scale movement
of populations – for example, the failure of government to deal with a famine, or
the  neglect  of  the  environment,  or  the  construction  of  a  large  dam which  will
displace a segment of society. Demographic engineering implies that the movement
itself is deliberately (italic is mine) induced by the state ; it is not the consequence of
another policy or program (63).
3 Thus whether the motives are political,  economic, strategic or ideological, any state
policy  aiming  to  ‘affect  the  size,  composition,  distribution,  and  growth  rate  of  a
population’  can  be  described  as  demographic  engineering  (Weiner  and  Teitelbaum
2001: 54). Forms of state intervention in this regard range from policies affecting birth
and fertility rates with the goal of eliminating the differences between ethnic groups
and  incorporating  smaller  groups  into  the  larger  and  dominant  ethnic  group,  to
population transfers, including deportation, resettlement, ethnic cleansing, as well as
economic pressures such as ‘selective tax policy’, restrictions in employment, property
rights, etc. (Bookman 1997 : 32-34 ; Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001 : 54-74). 
4 The relationship between demographic engineering and nationalism, particularly its
ethnic  form,  is  well-established.  As  McGarry  aptly  states,  the  development  of
nationalism has shaped demographic engineering in the modern period (1998 :  615).
The  impacts  of  the  development  of  nationalism  in  this  respect  are  twofold.  First,
ethnicity  in  many cases  became the primary criterion in  defining the affiliation to
nation and state, which were generally named on behalf of the dominant ethnic group.
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Secondly, the groups that did not belong to the dominant ethnicity were cast out of the
‘ethnic nation’ and were relegated to minority status and/or assimilated. Whenever
minorities developed ‘minority-based nationalist  movements’  they confronted states
and were viewed as threats to state security. As a result demographic engineering was
implemented against those groups which nationalism determined as being against the
state (McGarry 1998 : 615, 623). Forced population movements thus typically occurred
during wars for national self-determination in which the national was defined along
ethnic  lines  as  a  form  of  ‘ethnic  unmixing  through  migration,  murder,  or  some
combination of both’. As a result, demographic engineering occurred frequently in the
process  of  nation-state  formation,  the  ‘ethnic  nationalization  of  existing  states’
(Brubaker 1996 : 154-155), and during ethnic conflicts, especially as a method of conflict
management and resolution.2
5 Although the framework suggested so far has been formed through the cases of ethnic
conflicts  that were seen in the last  two decades in the regions stretching from the
Balkans to the Caucasus to Africa, it seems very applicable to policies adopted by many
states in the past, especially in the context of imperial decline, nation-state formation
and  nation-building  processes.  Intimately  related  to  the  rise  of  nationalism,
particularly  in  its  ethnic  form,3 governments  widely  attempted  to  homogenize
territories  within  their  jurisdiction  by  employing  the  methods  of  demographic
engineering.  Manipulation  of  population  figures  by  statistical  records,  deportation,
assimilation, massacres and ethnic cleansing were the most frequently used methods.
 
II. Forced Migration in the Ottoman Empire
6 The  Ottoman  Empire  illustrates  to  a  great  extent  the  manipulation  of  population
figures under the initiative of the state. From the 16th century until its final dissolution
in the first quarter of the 20th century, the Ottoman lands witnessed intensive state-
induced  population  mobility  between  regions.4 Forced  migration  in  the  Ottoman
Empire can be divided in three sub-periods. The first period extends from the 16th to
18th centuries when the Ottomans resorted to deportation and resettlement policy with
military, administrative, economic, and to some extent political motives. During the
second period, which extends from the second half of the 19th century into 1913, the
Ottoman lands became a shelter for Muslim refugees coming from the Caucasus and the
Balkans.  In  their  resettlement,  the  Ottoman  officials  exclusively  took  immigrants’
ethnic and  religious  affiliations  into  consideration,  especially  after  1878.  The  final
period, the years in between 1913-1918, population movements were the result of the
policy followed by a nationalist elite aiming to ethnically restructure the Empire’s core
territory, Anatolia.5 In the following, an overview of each sub-period will be presented
in accordance with the main purpose of this essay, which is to evaluate emigration/
immigration issue in Ottoman/Turkish history through the concept of  demographic
engineering.
7 Colonization through deportation (sürgün) and settlement was the principal means that
accompanied  military  conquest  in  the  making  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  (Barkan
1949-1950 :  544,  546).  Securing  their  domination  in  newly  conquered  territories,
increasing the power of the central authority, organizing agricultural production and
providing security and order seem to have been the general motives for the Ottomans
for  moving  a  particular  population  group from one  place  to  another  (Tekeli  1990 :
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50-54). The Ottomans resorted to mass deportation and resettlement on a large scale in
order to, for example, fill  empty land and make it inhabited and prosperous ,  or to
facilitate the dispatching of troops and supplying provisions by establishing villages
and towns through which they organized transportation and expeditions. There were
also political  motives (or goals)  behind the Ottomans’  deportation and resettlement
policy. Resettling Turkish and Muslim immigrants (muhacir) among ‘hostile’ elements
(Barkan 1951-1952 : 56-58) and moving Christians from the conquered territories were
viewed as preconditions of security and order (Barkan 1951-1952 : 62). The deportation
of  the  heterodox  population  whom  the  state  perceived  as  political  and  religious
troublemakers also reveals the political motives behind population moves in the earlier
periods of the Ottoman Empire (Barkan 1953-1954 : 228-229).
8 Examples of the early Ottoman deportation and settlement policy are many. One of the
most  illustrative  cases  is  the  deportation  of  groups  from  Anatolia  into  the  newly
conquered Cyprus (Barkan 1949-1950 : 550-561). According to the deportation decree of
24 September 1572,  ‘one family out of  every ten in the provinces of  Anatolia,  Rum
(Sivas), Karaman and Zülkadriye were to be sent to Cyprus’ in order to rehabilitate and
provide the security on the island. The deportees were to be chosen from peasants and
craftsmen who were to be exempted from paying taxes for two years in their  new
settlement (İnalcık 1954 : 123 ; Arslan 2001 : 337-345). Similarly, the Ottomans forcedly
moved population from Anatolia into the Balkans in order to consolidate their rule
there following the conquest (Barkan 1951-1952) and, conversely,  moved population
from the Balkans to Istanbul in order to make the city prosperous (İnalcık 1954 : 123).
In the 18th century, when the expansion of the Ottoman Empire through conquest came
to a halt, forced migration took the form of settling nomadic tribes in order to increase
agricultural production and provide domestic security (Tekeli 1990 : 52-54).
9 The  settlement  of  nomadic  tribes  continued  in  the  19th century  (Tekeli  1990 :  55) ;
however, the emigration of hundreds of thousands of Muslim Turks from territories
that were no longer within Ottoman jurisdiction requires a separate assessment of this
period. Throughout the 19th century challenges to Ottoman rule came mainly from two
sources : Russia, which was gradually expanding southward, and the nationalism of the
subject populations, beginning in the Balkans. Thus, imperial rivalry and nationalism,
and  the  wars  fought  around  these  produced  millions  of  refugees  in  the  region
stretching from the Caucasus into Anatolia and the Balkans (McCarthy 1995 : 1-21).
10 The first example of emigration was that of the Crimean Tatars, who had to flee from
their lands as a result of the Russian subordination of the region in the last quarter of
the 18th century.6 Their immigration continued into the 19th century, especially after
the Crimean War. During and following this war, hundreds of thousands Tatars were
forced  to  move  to  other  regions  because  of  discriminatory  Russian  policies  which
viewed them as a ‘harmful element’  and as a threat to security,  and due to fear of
Russification (Pinson 1970 : 32ff ; Karpat 1985 : 66). Following the Tatars, the Circassians
became  the  subject  of  the  Russian  policy  of  expulsion  in  the  1860s.  Besides
administrative,  military,  strategic  and  security  reasons,  ideological  and  cultural
concerns seem to have played a role in their emigration into Ottoman lands (Pinson
1970 : 85-86 ; Karpat 1985 : 67).7 Ottoman-Russian military confrontations continued to
produce Muslim refugees from the Caucasus and the Balkans in the coming decades.
The most illustrative case is the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish war.
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11 The  Russo-Turkish  war  also  displays  the  disruptive  effects  of  nationalism  in  the
Ottoman context. The principal cause of Muslim emigration from the Balkans in the
aftermath  of  the  war  was  nationalism,  which  had  already  become  a  legitimizing
ideology of independence demands for would-be states in the Balkans. In addition to
the considerable losses among the Muslim-Turkish population due to massacres during
and after the war, the emergence of independent Serbian and Romanian states and an
autonomous  Bulgaria  in  the  post-war  settlement  was  accompanied  by  the  flow  of
Muslim-Turkish refugees in huge numbers (İpek 1994). However, this was not a new
development  in  the  Balkans.  Since  the  beginning  of  the  19th century,  the
‘nationalization’ process among some groups brought about the ‘othering’ of others,
depending on the definition of the ‘imagined nation’. The Greek case is noteworthy in
this respect  since  it  was  the  first  and,  more importantly,  became a  role  model  for
emerging  nationalisms  in  the  Balkans  (McCarthy  1995 :  9-10).  During  and after  the
Greek struggle for independence Muslims became the target of the Greek nationalists.
They were the ‘alien’ elements of the Greek nation. They were massacred, forced to
leave and had their lands seized for the sake of nationalization. From the 1820s to the
1910s, the Greek policy-makers undertook such measures against Muslims within the
jurisdiction of the Greek state on several occasions.8
12 Nation-state formation gained momentum in the Balkans in the 1870s. In the aftermath
of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878,  the emergence of autonomous Bulgaria was
accompanied by the forced migration of the Muslims from the Bulgaria-owned lands. In
the space of approximately two decades, from 1870 to 1888, the Muslim population of
Bulgaria  decreased  sharply  as  a  result  of  the  attempts  to  make  ‘Bulgaria  for  the
Bulgarians’ (Brubaker 1996 : 153). From this period until the end of the 20th century,
Muslim  emigration  was  to  become  ‘a  recurrent  feature  of  Bulgaria’s  ethno-
demographic  development’  (Kalionski  2002 :  97).  The  responses of  the  Ottomans  to
Muslim emigration from the Balkans in particular may serve to illustrate not only their
short-term  reactions  but  also  a  long-term  policy  embedded  in  the  management  of
ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity, a policy that extended well into the inheritor
state of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic. First was the resettlement policy
that aimed to change the ethnic and religious demographic composition of  definite
regions for strategic, territorial and political reasons in favor of the Muslim/Turkish
elements. The second policy was the ethnic restructuring of Anatolia under a deliberate
act of the nationalist ruling elite. It was effectively implemented during the First World
War and went hand in hand with the resettlement policy.9
13 The Russo-Turkish War  of  1877-1878 caused tremendous  flows of  refugees  into  the
Ottoman lands. Over a million Muslim Turks had to emigrate from the Balkans (İpek
1994 :  40-41 ;  Karpat  1985 :  74).  The  state  attempted  to  resettle  these  refugees  in
accordance with its military, strategic and political concerns. Muslim-Turkish refugees
were resettled along the borders and in villages around the Straits in order to secure
the borders and the the Straits, and to balance the non-Muslim population in strategic
regions. In some cases, they were resettled in such a way as to surround non-Muslims
in order to counter-balance the latter and prevent them from forming the majority.
Resettlement  with  these  motives  was  carried  out  on  a  wide  geographical  scope
including Rumelia, Eastern Anatolia, the Vilayet of Hudavendigar and Macedonia on the
eve of the Balkan Wars (İpek 1994 : 155-159 ; 176-179 ; 197 ; 206-207 ; Ağanoğlu 2001 :
101-108).  In this  way,  the Ottoman state  promoted and added a  particular  group of
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population as settlers into some regions populated by minority groups.10 The second
response to refugee flows into the Ottoman lands was to remove definite population
groups, ‘enemies which in their present location pose a problem for the authorities and
an obstacle to their goals’ (McGarry 1998 : 615), ‘out of the country or from one portion
of the country to another’ (Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001 : 55-56). This overlaps with the
final phase of the forced migration in the Ottoman Empire which signifies a radical
break from the past in dealing with refugee problem as well as ethnic issues.
 
III. In Search of the Loyal Nation: The Committee of
Union and Progress’ Ethnic Restructuring Policy 
14 McGarry formulates two broad answers to his question ‘when do states move ethnic
groups?’ First, he suggests that states move a population that is categorized as ‘enemy
of the state’  when it  is  ‘captured by radical  (chauvinistic or anti-nationalist)  élites.’
Secondly, states force a definite group of population to migrate when their security is
considered to be threatened by minority groups. The rejection of the state’s authority
by  minority  leaders,  the  existence  of  inter-state  conflict  in  which  a  minority  is
perceived as a security,  the ‘fifth-column’ threat,  and the state’s  weak control  over
minority  regions  are  among  the  primary  circumstances  in  which  state  actors  feel
insecure and threatened by minorities (1998 : 623-625).
15 The last climactic phase of Ottoman-Turkish demographic engineering policies can be
grasped within this framework. On the eve of the First World War, nationalist elite
within the Committee of Union and Progress, who perceived world events through the
lens of Social Darwinism11 had seized power in the Ottoman Empire. During the First
World War, they focused their efforts on the demographic restructuring of Anatolia.
The survival of the state and the recently defined nation were the main motives behind
this attempt, and they found the practical justification in their failure to preserve the
state’s  territorial  integrity  against  minority  nationalisms  and  the  great  powers’
interventions. Nevertheless, the incessant flow of Muslim-Turkish refugees from the
Balkans during and in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars seems to induce the Unionist
élite into action in this respect. Their suffering at the hands of Bulgarian and Greek
nationalists who aimed to homogenize their territories reinforced and popularized the
Turkish nationalist sentiment (Edib 1930 : 115) and it stimulated the policy-makers into
developing ways of resettling them.
16 The resettlement of Muslim-Turkish refugees was not an end in itself  but part of a
broader project of ‘nationalizing’ or ‘Turcifying’ the Ottoman lands.12 This project had
two main aspects : forcing ‘disloyal’ elements to migrate and resettling supposed ‘loyal’
refugees into evacuated places. It  was with these goals that the Unionist leadership
inaugurated  a  campaign  against  the  Ottoman  Greeks  to  disrupt  their  economic
activities and to uproot them through coercive measures on the eve of the First World
War (Dündar 2008 : 191-248). The implementation of this policy against the Armenian
population  during  the  War  demonstrates  all  aspects  of  the  Unionist  demographic
mentality.  Legitimized  by  security  concerns,  measures  ranging  from  murder  and
massacre to religious conversion, assimilation and seizure of property were undertaken
simultaneously,  illustrating  political,  demographic  and  economic  aspects  of
demographic engineering.13
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17 A  similar  mentality  was  at  work  in  the  resettlement  of  the  Muslim  refugees.  The
Unionists made solid preparations to organize their resettlement in such a way that
they  would  efficiently  assimilate  into  the  Turkish  population.14 For  example,  they
enacted the Law for the Settlement of Immigrants, which led to the formation of the
General  Directorate  for  Settlement  of  Tribes  and  Refugees.  The  resettlement  of
Albanian and Bosnian refugees who were expelled from the Balkans and of the Kurds
fleeing before the Russian troops demonstrates that the Unionist government did not
want  to  see  any  non-Turkish  group  forming  a  majority  in  a  particular  region  and
constituting more than 5-10 % of the population. The Directorate was also in charge of
linguistic and ethnological research on ethnic and religious minorities in Anatolia such
as Kizilbashes, Bektâshis, Ahîs, Armenians, Alevis, Kurds and Turcomans, unequivocally
for political goals. It is estimated that approximately half of the Anatolian population,
approximately 8 million souls,  had to move during the First  World War due to the
Committee of Union and Progress’s deportation and resettlement policy (Dündar 2006 :
37-42).
18 When the First World War ended, the demographic composition of Anatolia had been
radically changed as a result of the Unionist wartime policy. In the aftermath of the
War a struggle broke out among the ethno-religious groups of Anatolia attempting to
preserve or change the existing demographic composition in accordance with their
political goals. Initially, the principle of self-determination, which was considered to be
the basic principle in remapping Anatolia in accordance with the population figures of
different  ethnic  groups  on  the  same  territory,  led  the  competing  groups  to  use
politicized  statistics  on  ethnic  populations  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference.15 Turkish,
Armenian, Greek, and Kurdish claimants presented a variety of numbers in order to
justify their nationalist causes for annexation, autonomy or independence. In addition,
each group resorted to violent measures in order to decrease the numbers of  rival
groups.  While  the  Turkish  nationalists,  for  example,  spent  considerable  effort  to
maintain the demographic status quo that resulted from the Unionist wartime policy by
setting  obstacles  before  the  repatriation  of  the  surviving  Armenian  deportees,  the
Greek and the Armenian nationalists made efforts to reverse this policy in favor of
their political goals by forcing the Muslim population to migrate in the Greek or Allied
occupied regions, and in some cases massacring them.16 Thus between 1919-1922 there
was a severe struggle among competing nationalisms aiming to fulfill their programs
by increasing the size of  the favored ethnic/religious group at the expense of  rival
groups. This struggle resulted in the almost complete elimination of the non-Muslim
population from Anatolia, mainly through coercive measures. However, the resolution
of  the  Turkish-Greek  conflict  through  an  internationally  sanctioned  treaty,  the
population  exchange  has  tremendous  symbolic  significance  as  it  shows  that  the
‘engineering’ mentality was not restricted to actors that were directly involved in the
struggle but was a widespread means of conflict resolution.17
 
IV. Reshaping the Nation in the Early Turkish Republic
19 The continuity in social, political and economic structures as well as in the government
policies between the late Ottoman and early Republican periods has frequently been
underlined. Among the continual aspects that can be traced between these two periods,
the ‘Turkification’ of social, economic and cultural life is preeminent. In this respect,
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the founders of the Turkish nation-state inherited a legacy from the previous period
that would shape both their mentality as well as practices in ‘nationalizing’ Turkey.
20 The Turkish nation-state was established on a Muslim foundation in 1923. The inter-
ethnic  struggles  that  accompanied  the  inter-state  wars  between 1912-1922  and  the
Committee of Union and Progress’s Turcification policy resulted a territory inhabited
by  an  approximately  98 %  Muslim  population.  Nevertheless,  the  Ottoman  Empire’s
multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual societal structure was inherited by the
new  state  despite  the  tremendous  quantitative  change.18 In  managing  the
heterogeneous  society,  the  founders  of  the  nation-state  employed  repressive  and
assimilative  means  in  accordance  with  a  Turkish  nationalism  that  defined  the
constituencies of the ‘imagined nation’ in 1920s and 1930s.19
21 Taking into consideration the citizenship definition of the 1924 Constitution and the
historical  and  linguistic  studies  that  formed  the  intellectual  basis  of  Turkish
nationalism in the early Republican era it can be argued that the Turkish nationalist
elite oscillated between civic-territorial and ethnic forms of nationalism (Poulton 1997 :
97). The 1924 Constitution stated that ‘the people of Turkey, regardless of religion and
race, are Turks as regards citizenship’ (Kili and Gözübüyük 2000 : 138). At first sight,
this definition defined citizenship as membership of the political community regardless
of  ethnic  origin ;  however,  this  did  not  come  to  mean  that  ethnicity  was  entirely
disregarded. As many practices demonstrate, the door was left open for the cultural
and linguistic assimilation of non-Muslim minorities and non-Turkish Muslims into the
supreme ethnic identity.20
22 Cultural and linguistic assimilation into Turkishness, which was defined around secular
and overtly ethnic nationalist terms, was the principal end, and repression, settlement
and deportation were the principal  means of  demographic engineering in the early
Turkish  Republic.  ‘Turcification’  policies  encompassed  curbing  non-Muslim
communities’s minority rights,  which had been granted in the Lausanne Settlement
(Alexandris 1992 : 135-139 ; Levi 1996 : 70-74 ; Bali 2000 : 59-77) forcing the public use of
Turkish under the motto ‘citizen, speak Turkish’  (Bali  2000 :  105-109),  to promoting
Muslim  immigration  from  the  Balkans  in  order  to  strengthen  ‘the  cohesion  and
homogeneity  of  Turkish  nation’,  settling  new  immigrants  among  the  Kurdish
population to provide a Turkish majority in overwhelmingly Kurdish-populated areas
and dispersing the Kurdish population among the Turks  through a  Settlement Law
enacted in 1934 (Ülker :  2007 and 2008), and finally, changing place names, a policy
Öktem (2009) calls ‘toponymical engineering’. There are many more examples of the
Turcification  policy,21 but  at  the  moment  it  is  proper  to  conclude  that  the
‘Turcification’ motive of Turkish nationalism was not restricted to the First World War
and early Republican periods but extended well into the end of the 20th century.22
 
Concluding Remarks
23 As it can be seen throughout this study, forced migration is one of the key issues in the
history  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  the  Turkish  Republic.  From  the  1950s  to  the
present,  several  studies  demonstrating  its  various  aspects  have  been  published.
Nevertheless, the treatment of the issue has predominantly adhered to state-centered
and nationalist  outlook,  especially in the evaluation of  forced migration in the late
Ottoman  and  early  Republican  eras.  In  explaining  the  Armenian  deportations  and
Forced Population Movements in the Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Repub...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 16 | 2013
8
massacres, for example, representatives of such an outlook highlight security concerns
and abstract the events from their social, political, ideological and economic milieu.
Instead of historicizing and comparing the Turkish case with other cases, they focus on
the  nationalist  activities  of  the  minority  leaders,  who  were  perceived  as  ‘fifth-
columnists’ by those who took the decision to deport the minority population. Studies
of this kind are usually dominated by a narrow empirical method. Such outlook has
undoubtedly served to present the deportations and accompanying events as a natural
consequence,  thus  legitimizing  and  justifying  the  state’s  actions.  Studying  state
intervention in population figures from a nationalist perspective and methodology thus
actually serves the function of ideologically reproducing the ‘nation’. Considering the
late Ottoman case, the state intervened in population for ‘nation-building’ by recasting
the  population  as  ‘loyal’  and  ‘disloyal’  or by  using  terms  such  as  ‘us’  and  ‘others’.
Narrating the actions that were taken in order to create the ‘loyal’ nation through the
perspective of those who undertook the actions reinforces a particular understanding
of ‘us’.
24 The  concept  of  demographic  engineering  should  be  considered  a  challenge  to  the
nationalist approach to the question of ‘why do states move populations ?’ The concept
does not aim at theorizing forced migration but to analyze it in a broader, integrative
perspective. It brings together the social, political and economic motives behind states’
intervention  in  populations  and  allows  us to  make  conceptual  analyses  of  events.
Situating forced migration into the context of demographic engineering also allows us
to  incorporate  contemporary  and historical  experiences,  as  it  provides  us  with  the
analytical means to compare similar cases in different times and places. In other words,
it  implicitly  suggests  that  forced migration or  state  intervention in population is  a
universal phenomenon and should be treated as such. By universalizing the language of
the forced migration, it enables us to write comparative cross-histories since more or
less every state in the modern age has resorted demographic engineering for different
purposes. Therefore, in the study of forced migration in the Ottoman-Turkish case, the
employment of this concept is likely to allow the systematic treatment of the issue in a
broad conceptual framework and enable us to extend the scope of discussion on past
and present issues relating to identity.
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1. From very earlier periods, forced migration has a close association with the state. It was the
political  figures acting behind the state who forced a  particular  group of  people to migrate.
Typical example is the Assyrian Empire in which forced migration was a frequently observed
practice. Between 11th and 7th centuries BC, it is stated that there were at least 157 population
transfer practices  led  by  the  Assyrian  rulers.  Approximately,  the  name  of  500  places  was
subjected to change and about 4.5 million persons were forced to migrate (Schechla 1993: 240). In
the following centuries, forced migration was increasingly practiced as a mean of conquest and
colonization. Especially, following the Age of Discovery, the Spanish carried out it on a large scale
with  the  purpose  of  removing  and  enslaving  the  indigenous  population  in  the  conquered
territories. In order to remove the natives from their territories, they effectively implemented a
policy  called  descargar  la  tierra,  empty the  land.  Similar  methods  were  also  practiced by  the
British in their conquest of, for example, Ireland and the American government in the policy of
removing the Indian population in the 19th century (Schechla, 1993: 241-244; Bell-Fialkoff 1993:
111-113).
2. Attempting to classify the methods of ethnic conflict management and termination, McGarry
and O’Leary  suggest  two principal  methods;  one  for  eliminating  differences  and another  for
managing them. As methods for eliminating differences, there are genocide, forced population
transfers,  partition  and/or  secession  and,  finally,  integration  and/or  assimilation,  which  all
actually  refer  to  demographic  engineering.  For  managing  differences,  there  are  mainly  four
methods:  hegemonic  control,  arbitration,  cantonisation  and/or  federalisation  and
consociationalism or power-sharing (McGarry and O’Leary 1993: 4).
3. The author of this study is aware of the vast literature on the terms nation, ethnicity, nation-
state, nationalism and nation-building and knows that there exist several approaches, definitions
and explanations changing in time. Within the limits of this study however, he does not aim to
make a review of these concepts as their applicability may well differ according to space and time
and in that they are subjects of a separate comprehensive study. For the purpose of this essay,
therefore, they are used flexibly as broad concepts embedded in the lexicon that emerged with
the rise of nationalism. For a workable review of these concepts see Smith (2001).
4. Erik-Jan Zürcher (2008) aptly defines the modern period of the Ottoman Empire in general and
the late Ottoman era in particular as ‘laboratory of demographic engineering’. 
5. This periodization is an approximate one. It is not claimed that it has general applicability.
6. There are diverse figures on the emigrated Tatars. While Tekeli (1990: 55) and Saydam (1997:
65)  give  the  numbers  of  emigrated  Tatars  between  1789-1800  as  500.000,  (Karpat  1985:  65)
estimates it as 80.000.
7. A challenging study that urges one to think that this was not a linear development has been
published  by  Meyer  who  suggests  that  ‘far  from  following  a  single-minded  policy  to  expel
Muslims from its territory, tsarists policy makers and bureaucrats endeavored increasingly in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries to induce Muslims to remain in Russia. Indeed, while influential
studies of Muslim emigration have argued that the Crimean War marked the beginning of an era
in which the forcible eviction of Muslims became an objective of Russian state policy, the year
1860 in fact marked the undertaking by the Russian government of new policies designed to limit
Muslim emigration. Policies aimed at retaining Muslim subjects were carried out through several
instruments  available  to  the  state.  These  included,  on  occasion,  attempts  at  dialogue  and
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persuasion but also frequently involved the use of force, intimidation, and violence’ (Meyer 2007:
27-28).
8. This is not peculiar situation to the national development of Greece and observable in every
case in the Balkan context. Under the circumstances shaped by the interaction of socio-economic
transformation  of  the  Ottoman  millets,  their  cultural  development  through  linguistic  and
historical studies, rise of the nationalist elites who adopted nationalism as political ideology in
manifesting socio-economic grievances of their societies against the Ottoman rule and eventually
striving  to  free  themselves  by  seeking  state-formation  are  observable  in  Serbia,  Greece  and
Bulgaria.  In  all  of  these  cases,  nationalization  process  brought  about  the  ‘othering’  of  the
Muslims (Karpat 1985: 70-75), who were perceived as the agents of the Ottoman rule and efforts
to eliminate them for homogenization. For nationalization processes in the Balkans in general
see Karpat (1973); Pavlowitch (1999); Jelavich (1983 and 1983) and Stavrianos (2000).
9. These were the measures taken as a result of the Muslim emigration into the Ottoman lands
and should be considered separately from the Ottoman state’s response to the development of
nationalism among the Ottoman millets,  notwithstanding response to nationalism and refugee
flows interacted and sometimes overlapped as was the case in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars.
As a matter of  fact,  such measures as promoting Ottoman identity,  extending the rights and
privileges of the millets and developing modern secular criteria for citizenship as response to
nationalisms of the millets (Davison 1977: 39-43) were the attempts at avoiding conflict by the
state  and providing integration.  In  that,  they signify  earlier  attempts  at  the management of
ethnic conflict. Resettlement of Muslim refugees and ethnic restructuring refer to a change in
mentality in dealing with ethno-religious issues. Flow of Muslim refugees seems to have a vital
role in this change. 
10. For addition as a form of state intervention see Weiner and Teitelbaum (2001: 55). McGarry
defines such settlers as ‘agents’ and suggests that they are settled in specific areas in order to
consolidate ‘state’s  control  of  the  area  and  its  resources’.  Among  their  functions,  there  is
minimizing ‘the risk of dissent and rebellion from local minorities (1998: 615-617).
11. Social Darwinism was very influential among the Ottoman intellectuals from 1890s to 1910s
(Doğan 2006). It also influenced the Ottoman military officers, who would be the members of the
Committee of Union and Progress, in militarism and nationalism. Reflections of this perspective
among the Unionists can be traced in their socialization process under German military thought
as well as their wars for survival from 1900s to 1910s (Nezir 2001); (Gawrych 1986).
12. For the evaluation of ‘Turcification’ as ‘nation-building’ process see Ülker (2005).
13. For the conceptual and narrative account of the Armenian deportation and massacres see
Bloxham (2005), Mann (2005: 111-179), Ülker (2005), Şeker (2007), Akçam (2008), Üngör (2008) and
Dündar (2008: 248-349).
14. Speaking  on  the  integration  of  the  Muslim  refugees  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Lausanne
settlement, Ülker points out that ‘migration became central to the nationalization policies of
Turkey not only as a refugee producing process but also as a refugee incorporation device, which
concerned  overwhelmingly  the  question  of  how  to  unify  the  ethnically,  culturally  and
linguistically diversified Muslim population’ explains also the motives in the resettlement of the
Muslim refugees during the World War I (2007: 2). 
15. At this point, the intimate relationship between ‘size and power’ should be underlined since
‘the relative size of group of people has been crucial in determining its political and economic
strength, both domestically and internationally.’ For an evaluation see Bookman (1997: 18-26).
16. The occupation of Izmir and its environ examplify this situation well.  Besides massacres,
between 80,000-120.000 Muslims were forced to migrate into inner Anatolia (Orhonlu 1973: 488).
The Ottoman response was the prohibition of the Muslim immigration, İkdam, 28 May 1919. 
17. As frequently stressed in this essay, population transfers, displacement, forced migration has
been seen throughout history on several parts of the world. The peculiarity of the Convention for
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Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey is that ‘for the first time in history the
international  community accepted the forcible uprooting and the accompanying distress and
hardship of thousands of peaceful and law-abiding citizens’ (Pentzopoulos 1962: 61-62).
18. According to the official census of 1935, among the 16.157.450 total population, there were
Greek Orthodox, Jewish, Gregorian Armenian, Catholic, Protestant peoples besides Muslims. In
addition, Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic, Greek, Circassian, Laze, Armenian, Goergian, Judeo-Spanish,
Pomak, Bosnian, Albanian, Bulgarian, Tatar, Spanish, Abkhazian, Romanian and French were the
languages spoken by various ethno-religious communities (Cagaptay 2004: 93). 
19. Several  studies  have  attempted  to  uncover  the  Turkish  nation-state’s  policy  toward
minorities as well as non-Turkish Muslims. Cagaptay (2006), Yıldız (2001), Bali (2000), Okutan,
(2004), Aktar (2006a and 2006b) and Ülker (2007) have revealed political, economic and cultural
aspects of this policy. 
20. For an analysis of the relationship between citizenship and ethnic origin see Yeğen (2002).
21. A  study  by  Guttstadt  (2006:  50-56)  focuses  on  another  aspect  of  ‘Turcification’  policy
comprising  of  ‘naturalization’  (giving  citizenship  readily to  Muslim  immigrants)  and
‘denaturalization’ (depriving the Turkish citizenship rights of many non-Muslims) in the case of
Turkish Jews. 
22. From Wealth Tax of 1942 to 6-7 September Events in 1955; from the plan that was prepared by
the State Planning Organization after the military intervention of 1960 for the assimilation of the
Kurds (Milliyet, 22 January 2008) to forced evacuation of some Kurdish villages in 1990s, it seems
possible to sketch the implementation of this policy and the mentality as embedded one in the
minds of administrative and political cadres in management of ethnic issues. 
ABSTRACTS
This article uses the concept of “demographic engineering” for the purpose of analyzing forced
migration  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  early  Turkish  Republic.  It  defines  demographic
engineering in a wide sense, as ‘deliberate state intervention in population figures’ for political,
ideological,  strategic  and economic  reasons.  It  argues  that  reconsidering  the  issue  of  forced
migration  in  the  Ottoman Empire  and  the  early  Turkish  Republic  as  a  case  of  demographic
engineering provides us with an analytical tool enabling comprehensive understanding of the
state-directed population movements, and challenges the state-centered, nationalist outlook that
has dominated the historiography on forced migration of the late Ottoman Empire. 
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